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Why do people kill themselves? In many cases we never
know for certain, but it must usually mean that life has
become unbearable. The “slings and arrows of outra-
geous fortune” can no longer be tolerated, and suicide
becomes a means to “take arms against a sea of troubles
and, by opposing, end them” (Shakespeare’sHamlet, act
III, scene I). For some persons, Huntington disease (HD)
becomes one of those unbearable burdens. In his original
description of the disease, George Huntington (1872)
himself referred to HD as “that form of insanity that
leads to suicide” (p. 321). Although accurate figures are
difficult to determine (Stenager and Stenager 1992),
most investigators have concluded that Huntington was
correct—suicide is indeed a more frequent cause of death
among persons with HD than among the general pop-
ulation. In the literature, the range of
HD deaths reported to be the result of suicide is
0.5%–12.7% (Harper 1996); the 5.7% rate found by
Farrer (1986) is the most commonly quoted. This rep-
resents approximately four to five times the 1.0%–1.5%
suicide rate for the general population of the United
States (Roy 1995). This unfortunate phenomenon is not
surprising, given the often agonizing clinical course of
HD and the common occurrence of serious depression
(9%–44%) in persons with the disorder (Harper 1996).
Prior to the development of DNA testing for HD, a
study involving persons at risk for the disease revealed
that ∼75% would take advantage of accurate presymp-
tomatic testing (Barette and Marsden 1979). Now that
DNA testing is available, ∼25% of persons at risk are
apparently involved in genetic testing programs. What
will be the emotional toll of such testing on this vul-
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nerable population? Wexler (1985) elegantly reviewed
the complex issues in this field at the beginning of the
DNA testing era and asked the poignant question:
Would this new genetic knowledge be life enriching or
destructive?
Some colleagues argued that there was unnecessary
anxiety over the potential consequences of DNA testing
for HD. They pointed out that doctors give patients bad
news every day (e.g., diagnoses of cancer, AIDS, or ALS).
Conversely, it can be argued that HD is one of a small
group of really dreadful diseases. The diagnosis of HD
typically implies all of the following: (1) a progressive
degenerative brain disorder in the prime of life, (2) a
socially embarrassing and disabling movement disorder,
(3) serious cognitive and behavioral changes, (4) no cure
or even effective treatment, (5) shortened life span, and
(6) a 50% risk of the same disorder for each child. Fur-
thermore, asymptomatic persons are not told they have
the “disease” but that they have inherited a mutation
that will lead to the disease at some unknown future
date: the prolongation of an already nearly intolerable
ambiguity. Clearly, informing highly anxious, asymp-
tomatic persons that they carry the gene for such a con-
dition would have to be done with considerable
trepidation.
Almqvist et al. (1999 [in this issue]) provide important
new information on the emotional responses of persons
undergoing genetic testing for HD. The authors surveyed
100 centers in 21 countries and gathered information
on 4,527 individuals who had received predictive genetic
testing for HD, through either linkage analysis (16.4%)
or more-recent direct DNA testing (83.6%). In this pop-
ulation, the authors investigated psychiatric “cata-
strophic events,” which they defined as suicide, at-
tempted suicide, or acute hospitalization for psychiatric
reasons. These catastrophic events might be viewed as
the proverbial canary in the coal mine. That is, if the
catastrophic event rate is too high (the canary loses con-
sciousness), then genetic counselors and family members
(the miners) need to abandon presymptomatic HD test-
ing programs (the mine).
How dangerous is the HD genetic testing mine? The
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Almqvist et al. (1999) study addresses this question; the
results can be briefly summarized. Of the 4,527 persons
undergoing testing, there were 5 completed suicides, 20
suicide attempts, and 18 psychiatric hospitalizations, for
an overall catastrophic event rate of 0.97%. Further-
more, 1,817 persons (40.1%) were confirmed to be at
increased risk of developing HD. This group had a 2%
rate of catastrophic events, and all five completed sui-
cides were in this subpopulation. Most of the serious
episodes occurred !18 mo after the individuals’ receipt
of the test results, and all five completed suicides oc-
curred in persons who had subsequently developed clin-
ical symptoms of the disease. Of interest, 7 (0.3%) of
the 2,601 persons who were confirmed to be at decreased
risk also experienced a catastrophic event.
This information, incomplete though it may be, is crit-
ical to our assessment of the present state of HD genetic
testing and crucial to our planning for the future. Like
all good studies, the study by Almqvist et al. (1999) is
informative but also provocative, raising many addi-
tional issues and questions. Given the international na-
ture of the study, the investigators made a commendable
attempt at relatively complete ascertainment. Their fol-
low-up study of 47 initially nonparticipating centers re-
vealed no evidence for unexpected biases in the original
data. It can be argued that the testing centers are so
cautious in their protocols that diffusion of such genetic
testing into the broader, less methodical medical com-
munity will result in a higher incidence of adverse events.
Of course, this may not necessarily be true. In fact, some
individuals resent what they view as an excessively con-
servative, paternalistic attitude of academic centers to-
ward testing.
There is also undoubtedly a self-selection of persons
undergoing testing. What characteristics currently com-
pel a minority of HD family members to pursue genetic
testing? Are those who pursue testing more, or less, likely
to have catastrophic events? What will happen if reluc-
tant family members who have elected not to undergo
testing begin to do so? Will they have a greater or lesser
risk of catastrophic events?
The psychiatric outcome is unknown for 119 partic-
ipants in the Almqvist et al. (1999) study, because these
persons were lost to follow-up. The results of the study
would be significantly different if a large proportion of
this group experienced catastrophic events, but there is
no way to determine how this missing information
would have affected the study.
Most of the persons in this study were followed up
for only 1–2 years (59% for 1 year). Will the rate of
catastrophic events increase or decrease as time passes?
Thus far, the results of this study suggest that the event
rate is stable over time (0.44%/year). Furthermore, as
the gap between learning the test results and a cata-
strophic event increases, the likelihood that there is a
direct correlation between the results and the event de-
creases. The subsequent realization that symptoms of the
disease are appearing may be more important than the
initial test results.
To continue the coal-mine analogy, it is important to
recognize that toxic fumes are not the only hazards in
a mine. Likewise, suicide attempts and psychiatric hos-
pitalizations are only a small fraction of the potential
adverse results of genetic testing for HD. Such events
are clearly only the tip of the iceberg. The effect of test
results on a wide variety of other factors—marriage and
other personal relationships, employment, insurance,
family planning, and other mental and physical measures
of well-being—need to be considered. It is instructive
that a small number of persons in this study who re-
ceived negative (i.e., decreased risk) results also expe-
rienced catastrophic events. Learning that one has not
inherited the gene for HD clearly does not erase the
burdens from the lives of these apparently fortunate per-
sons—nor are those at risk for the disease the only ones
affected by the test results. When we conducted a local
study of suicide in HD families, we were sobered to find
a spouse who had killed herself after struggling with the
illness in her husband and all three of their children
(Hans and Koeppen 1980; Lipe, et al. 1993). The distress
of HD testing can also have a direct impact on the emo-
tional well-being of health care providers who end up
being the bearers of bad news. Sometimes the counselors
need counseling.
How should we interpret the major findings of this
study? How do we put these results in perspective? Is
there a control group for such an investigation? Is the
suicide rate average or high, good or bad, changeable
or fixed? There were five completed suicides in the 1,817
individuals who received a positive (i.e., increased risk)
test result. This equates to ∼275 suicides per 100,000
persons. Because most of the suicides occurred2 years
after testing, we can extrapolate a completed suicide rate
of 138/100,000 persons per year. The suicide rate among
the general US population is reported to be ∼12–13 per
100,000 persons (Roy 1995); the suicide rate reported
by Almqvist et al. (1999) is therefore 10 times the US
rate. These figures seem to confirm, or at least coincide
with, the suicide rates previously reported for sympto-
matic patients with HD, which varied from 7 to 10 times
the US average (Harper 1996). But this was an inter-
national study, and suicide rates vary among countries.
The rate varies from !10/100,000 persons in Ireland to
130/100,000 persons in Hungary (Roy 1995). The su-
icide rate reported by Almqvist et al. (1999) is ∼6.6 times
that of the average rate in Sweden, which is 21/100,000
persons.
Suicide rates also vary with several other factors, in-
cluding sex, socioeconomic status, and age (Roy 1995).
The suicide rate is higher in individuals with other se-
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rious mental and physical diseases, such as schizophre-
nia, depression, panic disorder, cancer, multiple sclerosis
(MS), and AIDS (Weissman et al. 1989; Westermeyer, et
al. 1991; Cote´ et al. 1992; Stenager et al. 1992; Storm
et al. 1992). Furthermore, debate continues over
whether suicide is ever a “rational” decision by a person
seemingly facing an overwhelming sea of troubles and
an unbearable life. Jack Kevorkian’s first assisted suicide
was a woman in the early stages of Alzheimer disease,
and persons with ALS and MS have been prominent
among his subsequent cases (Rohde et al. 1995). Ra-
tionality is a “multidimensional construct,” as noted by
Conwell and Caine (1991): “The presence of depression
does not imply that a patient’s choice is irrational, nor
does the absence of mental illness imply rationality).
We must be better able to distinguish between people
whose suicidal intent is clearly conceived and free of
distorting mental disturbances, and people who are in
need of psychiatric care” (p. 1102).
Almqvist et al. (1999) have made a valuable contri-
bution by assembling and analyzing this important in-
formation about HD testing. We may conclude that they
have presented us with good news and bad news. The
good news is that at least half the people undergoing
HD genetic testing receive negative results, and even
those receiving a positive result do not show a rate of
suicide higher than that of the general symptomatic HD
population. Nor is the rate out of proportion to that of
other groups with serious, progressive diseases; the re-
silience and strength of many persons receiving grave
disappointment can be impressive and even inspiring.
The majority of persons receiving an increased risk of
HD appear to cope remarkably well with this new in-
formation. The bad news is that, within 2 years of re-
ceiving the test results, 2% of this increased risk group
experiences serious catastrophic psychiatric events, in-
cluding completed suicide. We must strive to reduce the
rate of catastrophic events among this population.
In our role as physicians and counselors committed
to the relief of suffering, what can we do to reduce this
catastrophic event rate? One option would be to ter-
minate presymptomatic genetic testing for HD. This
would fly in the face of an important historical trend in
medical care, which has been to provide available
knowledge about an individual’s health when the indi-
vidual chooses to receive it and feels there are compelling
and cogent reasons to obtain it. A critical factor in coun-
seling such persons is careful education prior to any
testing: education not just about the test, but about the
disease, about the option not to proceed with testing,
and about the possible psychosocial implications of
learning test results (knowing full well that we do not
know all the implications). Many clinics offer detailed
printed information about HD testing, including a book-
let published by our program (Bennett 1996). It is im-
portant that as geneticists we do not appear to be pro-
moting or advocating presymptomatic DNA testing for
everyone at risk. Most persons seeking DNA testing have
strong hopes that the result will be negative. They must
be encouraged to give careful thought to the possibility
of a positive test result, how they might react to a pos-
itive result, and the ways in which it could change their
lives.
The Almqvist et al. (1999) study provides some guid-
ance for recognition of individuals who may be espe-
cially vulnerable for serious negative outcomes after HD
testing. The results of the study suggest that the person
at greatest risk for suicide is an unemployed woman who
receives a positive result, develops early symptoms !1
year after the test, and has a history of psychiatric illness.
This profile becomes less helpful when we consider that
more women than men elect to be tested, the study’s
definition of “unemployed” included homemakers, and
the majority of catastrophic events were not associated
with a history of psychiatric illness. It should also be
noted that, in our local study, all the completed suicides
were in men (Lipe et al. 1993). Clearly, all persons un-
dergoing HD testing require careful evaluation in the
pretesting stage.
Depression should be recognized and treated prior to
testing. Persons with depression or a history of psychi-
atric illness should be evaluated by a psychiatrist or clin-
ical psychologist knowledgeable about HD. Testing can
be postponed until both patient and counselor agree to
proceed. Because use of firearms is the most common
method of suicide in this country, encouraging HD fam-
ilies to remove guns from their homes can be another
important precaution (Kellermann et al. 1992). Most
important, every person undergoing HD testing must
have careful and compassionate support in the weeks
and months after the test. The availability of an iden-
tified and trusted support person who accompanies the
at-risk individual through the entire testing process can-
not be overemphasized. The thousands of persons un-
dergoing HD testing, and the even greater number of
individuals undergoing genetic testing for other similar
diseases, will require an extensive, expensive, and labor-
intensive counseling network. Such a network does not
now exist. Who will develop it? Who will be trained to
work within it? Who will pay for it? Society has only
begun to struggle with these questions. As members of
the American Society of Human Genetics, we are obli-
gated to help answer these questions. I believe we should
continue to provide HD genetic testing, but the process
needs ongoing monitoring, refinement, and support. We
need to keep a wary eye on all available warning canaries
in the HD testing mine. The study by Almqvist et al.
(1999) is a valuable step in that direction.
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